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Abstract
How do we, humans, communicate with computers, or computational machines? What are the
activities do humans and machines share, what are the meeting points between the two? Eventually,
how can we build concepts of these meeting points that leaves space for the proper mode of existence
of both humans and machines, without subduing one to the other?
Computers are machines that operates on a scale different from humans: the calculus done by
machines is too fast and untangible for humans. This is why computers' activities has to be
textualized, put into a form that can be understand for humans. For instance into a graphical interface,
or a command line. More generally, this article tackles the problem of interface between humans and
machines, the way the relation between humans and machines has been conceptualized. It is inspired
both by philosophy of the modes of existence – since computers are machines with their own mode of
existence – and semiotics, since computers' activities have to be converted in some sort of signs that
can be read by humans.
First, inspired by Gilbert Simondon, we try to understand the mode of existence of computational
machines. By commenting on Turing 1936's seminal article, On Computable Numbers, we show that
computational machines are at their core writing machines. But a writing based on calculus, different
from the human way of writing. Writing can therefore be understood as a meeting point for humans
and machines, provided we give a definition of writing that is large enough to include both humans
and machines. Secondly, we examine theories that deals with the relationship between the two,
mostly english-speaking theorists of interface (Manovich, Galloway) compared to french semiotics of
"les écrits d'écran" ("written writing screens"). We show that both approaches share an
anthropocentric conception of machines and/or writing, making the machine a mere instrument
fulfilling human needs. Eventually, we propose some elements towards a non-anthropocentric
semiotics, by focusing on the notions of interpretation and the spatiality of writing. This nonanthropocentric semiotics is the first step towards a semiotics that would make room for the mode of
existence of computational machines, enabling us to renew the way we think our relationship to them.
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I. Introduction
How does one communicate with computational machines, those technical objects
that function by means of binary calculations integrated into a piece of electronic
machinery? How do human beings interact with machines that execute
instructions inscribed on a surface of less than 100mm2 in a few fractions of a
microsecond? The problem is that humans do not have a perceptual apparatus
capable of handling this spatio-temporal scale: we are unable to deal with the
difference between 0 and 5 volts. However, for the machine, this difference is
highly significant since it is the basis of the binary code that organises the way it
stores and handles data.
For humans and machines to meet, bridges have to be built between their
different requirements. “Interfaces”, or mediating texts such as source codes and
“architexts” – to use a term invented by a whole section of French media theory –
do constitute bridges of a sort. However, these notions tend to mask the technical
reality of the machines, because they are organized around an anthropocentric
understanding of writing. Is it not true that “interfaces” give rise to an
organisation of signs that are meaningful to humans, i.e. texts? Source codes and
other architexts can be effective at the machine level; but in the final analysis,
surely their purpose is to produce texts that are readable and meaningful to
humans? In other words, how can we conceptualize the bridges between humans
and machines without subordinating the one to the other? How can we make each
of the two realities exist in itself, which is the pre-condition for exploring the
possibility of their interrelationship? How can we find common ground, a
common meeting-point, from which to make the differences between these two
realities explicit, and what could this meeting-point be?
We suggest that the common ground might be found in writing.
Computational machines are in fact writing machines. Not only because they are
instruments with which human beings can write, but because their own
functioning depends on a certain kind of writing, writing that does not correspond
to the same requirements as human writing. The point is that binary writing,
which obeys the rules of elementary arithmetic and Boolean logic, does not
conform to the same constraints as the alphabetic writing of humans. In other
words, the writing of these machines is quite different in nature to the writing of
humans. We have called the writing of these machines computational writing and
the writing of humans textual writing. It is important to identify the specificity of
each of these two kinds of writing in order to understand digital media not only as
a regime of human meaning, but as a place where humans and machines meet,
and which we must learn to understand as fundamentally hybrid. This is why we
are calling for a new kind of non-anthropocentric semiotics, and giving some
pointers here towards its development.
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First, we will try to explain why computational machines can properly be
understood as writing machines. This will involve developing a concept of
“writing” that is not anthropocentric, and understanding – like Turing – that these
machines function based on a form of writing, and how they do so. Our second
aim will then be to show that the theories that have attempted to conceptualize
interactions between humans and machines, without the benefit of the notion of
computational writing, end up by evacuating the computational machines
themselves from the relationship they are attempting to characterize. Thus,
theories constructed around the idea of interface, of software, or - in Continental
theories - the concepts of "screens-as-writing” (écrits d’écran) and “architext”
(architexte)1, are all based on anthropocentric presuppositions concerning writing
and thus run the risk of neglecting the activity of the actual machine in the
implementation of digital media. These theories tend to promote an instrumental
conception of these machines in which, because they are considered merely as
means to human ends, they are either relegated to the role of perfect executors of
programmes written by humans, or else understood as crystallizing human values
and extensions of power relationships – both symbolic and economic. Our third
goal is to describe the specificities of the computational writing performed by
machines, in order to open up the possibility of developing a non-anthropocentric
type of semiotics that would help to describe the role of computational machines
in the reality of computerized media in their own terms: in other words, to accept
that the machines themselves contribute to the culture and the new world that we
now share with them.
II. Computational machines as writing machines
The basis for characterizing computational machines as writing machines is an
article by Alan Turing, On Computable Numbers2. This article is crucial, not only
because it makes an important contribution to resolving a problem in logic known
as the Entscheidungsproblem (decision problem), but above all because it is
without a doubt one of the most important texts in the history of computer
science. In 1936, Turing produced the theoretical model of what is today called a
“computer”, a model that was taken up by Von Neumann and his colleagues in
their First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC3, where they specify the material
organisation of such a machine: this is the famous “Von Neumann architecture”.
Yves Jeanneret and Emmanuël Souchier, “Pour une poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” Xoana
6 (1999).
2
Alan Turing, “On computable numbers, with an application to the
entscheidungsproblem,” Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42/2 (1936).
3
John Von Neumann, “First draft of a report on the EDVAC,” IEEE Annals of the
History of Computing 15/4 (1993 [1945]).
1
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The ideas advanced in Turing’s text are still entirely valid and operational in
contemporary computer science, which is why this text is truly foundational and
why it is well worth taking a closer look at it.
In 1936, Alan Matheson Turing, then a student at King’s College
Cambridge, wrote an article on the Entscheidungsproblem, a problem in logic that
was first posed by Hilbert and Ackermann in 1928. In order to answer the
question, Turing imagined a machine made up of a tape divided into squares and a
mobile head that would move along a horizontal axis, either to the right or to the
left of the tape. The head would scan the squares; it would also print, or delete,
symbols on the current square. According to Turing, this machine would be able
to solve the axiom of choice problem, since it would calculate anything that is
algorithmically calculable.
In his attempt to resolve the Entscheidungsproblem posed by Hilbert and
Ackermann, Turing begins by explaining that it is first necessary to define what is
meant by a “calculable number”: it is a number “whose decimal form can be
written down by a machine”. In Turing’s formulation there is thus a clear
proximity between writing and calculation. However, it is important to understand
that this is writing of a very specific kind. For the machine to be able to calculate,
it must be provided with a tape “analogous to paper”, divided into squares “like a
child’s arithmetic book”, and on which it can “write down” symbols. These
symbols are either of the first order, i.e. numbers which in the event are made up
purely of 0’s and 1’s; or of the second order, for example a letter “A” which can
replace a given sequence of numbers. The machine can be considered as a
“calculating machine” when it can manipulate the two orders of symbols, and not
just first-order symbols. The machine is thus finite because all its operations
(movements of the head, inscription or deletion of symbols) are determined by its
internal configurations, which are limited: the behaviour of the machine can thus
be programmed. But the machine is also finite in the sense that it is entirely
automatic: it has no need, in order to function, for any external intervention
(human or other) – provided that the set of all possible configurations has been
described correctly, i.e. that it has been correctly programmed.
Nevertheless, although writing and calculating are almost synonymous, it
is interesting to note that Turing never says that his machine “reads”, nor that it
“writes”. He explains that the machine scans, and that it can only work on the
symbol that it is currently scanning: “the scanned symbol is the only one of which
the machine is, so to speak, ‘directly aware’”4. In other words, the machine has no
memory. But the machine does “interpret”: for each symbol that it scans, there is
a precise operation which it must perform. The machine thus acts according to
4

Turing, “On Computable Numbers,” 236.
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what it has scanned. To “scan” is to detect by moving the reading head along the
tape, i.e. it is a form of “reading” which is one-dimensional – to the left or to the
right. Similarly, the machine does not really “write” either; Turing says that it
“notes” or “writes down” or “prints” symbols. The mathematician structures his
argument around an analogy between the machine and a human being: “we may
compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is
only capable of a finite number of conditions”; “Computing is normally done by
writing certain symbols on paper. We may suppose that this paper is divided into
squares like a child’s arithmetic book”5; a tape which is “analogous to paper”.
But he takes care not to cross the boundary that would attribute human
behaviour to the machine.
Rather than contributing to the myth of the human machine, Turing
contributes instead to a mechanical reduction of the human, but one which is
provisional. Turing does indeed need to model and formalize human reasoning so
that calculation can then become automatic. The analogy between the operations
of humans and those of machines thus tends more towards a limited reduction of
the human to the mechanical, rather than elevating the machine to the level of
human intelligence. He does not seek to make the entire range of human
intellectual operations mechanical, only calculation. It must not be forgotten that
when he refers to a “computer”, he is not designating the machines that we call
“computers” today, but rather the human employees whose work consists of
carrying out various sorts of calculations: statistical, accounting, etc. The Turing
machine is thus a logical formalization of the task of human calculators. In
paragraph 9, where he formalizes human reasoning and then evokes the
possibility of mechanizing it, he ends up by establishing an analogy between these
very specific intellectual operations performed by humans and mechanical
operations. Human calculation, he explains, is based on two essential operations.
Firstly, it consists of the writing of a finite set of symbols on paper, often
squared6. Secondly, the human calculator then acts according to the symbols that
s/he sees, but also according to his or her “state of mind” on the spur of the
moment. While it is possible for the “states of mind” to vary, the number of
different states of mind that are possible cannot be infinite – otherwise, here
again, no discrimination would be possible. Secondly, after the system of signs
come the “elementary operations” of the human calculator: either the writing of a
new sign on the square currently observed, or else observing a new square – each
time with or without a change in the state of mind. When human calculation is
5
6

Turing, “On Computable Numbers,” 231.
The symbols must be limited in number, otherwise it may not be possible to tell at
glance the difference between two inscriptions, for example between 99999999 and
9999999
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formalized in this way, it can then be made automatic: “We may now construct a
machine to do the work of this computer”7. At this point, Turing gives the details
of this automation. It is here that he describes most closely the analogy between
the human and the machine: to the “state of mind” of the calculator corresponds a
“configuration” of the reading-head of the machine; to the squares that are
“observed” by the calculator correspond the squares “scanned” by the machine; to
the “changes” done by the calculator correspond the “moves” of the machine.
These mechanical “moves” and human “changes” are always strictly determined,
respectively by the configuration of the reading-head and by the “state of mind”
accompanying the square under observation. If we follow Turing, every
calculation can be brought down to operations of writing symbols, of reading
(observation or scanning, according to whether the operator is a human or a
machine), and modifications of states.
What is at issue in this text is the construction of a relationship between a
human being and a machine – a relationship built upon writing. To be able to
conceive his automaton, Turing has to proceed to a mechanical reduction of the
human. The human-machine relationship is then of the order of an analogy. But
what is interesting is that once the machine has been conceived and described, the
relationship is no longer analogical: the human and the machine do not do the
same things, they are different. The human is not a machine and the machine is
not a human. It is true that they have something in common, i.e. a certain form of
writing. This is the place where their relationship is made explicit. But this
relationship is nevertheless strongly differentiated, in the sense that humans and
machines do not use the same sort of writing. The writing of humans is of the
order of what we propose to call textual writing, whereas that of machines is of
the order of computational writing.
Before we attempt to characterize these two orders of writing, in what
sense can we really say that a machine “writes”? To do so, we have to adopt a
technical conception of writing: “writing”, in this sense, is inscribing signs on a
substrate. An “inscription” here is to be understood in the sense of a material
alteration, circumscribed to a specific space and not resulting from chance. An
“inscription” in this sense does indeed follow a set of rules which prescribe a
finite set of possible alterations: the French alphabet, for example, or a binary
language. But inscriptions thus defined are not yet signs; in order to become
signs, they must: i) designate something other than what they are materially8; and
7
8

Turing, “On Computable Numbers,” 247.
Following the model of Ferdinand de Saussure (Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de
Linguistique Générale. Paris: Payot, 1916), a sign is made of a signifier and a signified.
The relationship between the two is arbitrary, meaning there is no direct connection
between the letter of a word or a picture and what it represents. This relationship is
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ii) they must be “read”, i.e. they must be recognized as meaningful alterations and
interpreted as “referring to something else”. We are indeed dealing with signs
when, for example, the letter “A” represents a sound in a human language; or
when an “0” is an electromagnetic alteration which expresses the absence of
value, or the logical value of “false” when the interpretation is made according to
the principles of Boolean logic. In order to become a sign, an inscription thus
requires an act of reading and interpretation.
This three-part definition of writing as the inscription of signs on a
substrate is not anthropocentric, in the sense that it does not immediately consider
writing as the exclusive privilege of humans. It also has the advantage of being
sufficiently broad to include a wide variety of practices from different historical
and cultural contexts. For example, the Roman soothsayer, who circumscribed a
region of the sky in order to observe the trajectories of birds and thereby elucidate
the favours of the gods, practiced writing; so does the journalist who composes an
editorial for the upcoming edition of the newspaper for which he works; and the
same goes for a machine which scans symbols and adjusts its behaviour
accordingly.
However, this definition has its drawbacks. It is too general and doesn’t
take the context of writing into account: it considers a practice (writing) without
any regard for its social, historical or cultural context. Therefore, it is hard to see
what might not be considered as a piece of writing. What is certain is that a
writing practice does not rely exclusively on know-how, on the mastering of a
specific technique. It also relies on mental representations of writing, and the
status it has in a given society. The same invention – writing considered as the
inscription of symbols on a substrate – has very different implications when it is
used as a memorandum for shamanic incantations in Native American tribes9 or
when it becomes the central tool for the domination of a social caste in ancient
Mesopotamia10. The same can be said about writing applied to computers. As
Annette Vee put it, digital literacy is not only a matter of mastering a certain kind

based on a convention. If the relationship is arbitrary, this implies that a signifier (for
instance the letters that form the word “computer”) signifies something different (a
computational machine) to what it is materially: a string of letters.
9
Pierre Déléage, Inventer l’écriture. Rituels chamaniques Rituels prophétiques et
chamaniques des Indiens d’Amérique du Nord, XVIIe-XIXe siècles (Paris: Les Belles
Lettres, 2013).
10
Jean-Jacques Glassner, Écrire à Sumer. L’invention du cunéiforme (Paris: Le Seuil,
2000).
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of knowledge, i.e. programming. Literacy is an issue in societies that emphasise
and value its mastery11.
But the question of digital literacy, as formulated by Vee, is relevant on
another level. Programming is writing for the machine, designed to make the
machine follow instructions. These instructions have to be readable for the
machine but also for humans. In this case, context is of primary importance and
programming cannot be reduced to mere instructions to a machine. Recent work
shows that computer code is not just a set of instructions for a machine. Also
discernible in computer code are the marks of the context in which it was
produced12. It obeys a visual rhetoric – indents, layout design, comments, etc. –
that make it readable for humans13. It is also rooted in professional environments
and job markets where the economic and symbolic stakes are high14 and which
influence the way developers write software.
Our question, however, is different. Our aim is to understand the writing
of the machine, in other words to find out whether the activity of the machine can
be qualified as "writing" and what the implications of this would be. By arguing,
as Turing does, that a computational machine is a writing machine, we are making
a strategic move. But it is strategic only because we live in a society where
writing, as well as reading, has great symbolic importance15. Saying that
something like a computer "writes" is therefore a way of promoting it to the status
of "those who matter" in the symbolic order of humans. To qualify the activity of
computational machines as "writing" is to use the symbolic value of writing to
make room for machines in our contemporary "scriptural economy" 16, and
therefore to lay the grounds for acknowledging these non-human entities not as
tools or instruments for humans, but as entities with their own way of doing what
they do.

Annette Vee, “Understanding Computer Programming as a Literacy,” Literacy in
Composition Studies 1/2 (2013): 45.
12
Tania Bucher, “Objects of intense feeling: the case of the Twitter API,”
Computationnal Culture 3 (Online publication, 2013). Available online:
http://computationalculture.net/article/objects-of-intense-feeling-the-case-of-thetwitter-api
13
Joanna Pomian and Emmanuël Souchier, “Informatique et pratiques écrivantes,”
Traverses 43 (1988).
14
Adrian MacKenzie, “The Performativity of code: software and cultures of circulation,”
Theory, Culture & Society 22/1 (2005).
15
Roger Chartier, The Order of Books (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
16
Michel De Certeau, L’invention du quotidien. Tome I: Arts de Faire (Paris: Gallimard,
1990).
11
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For machines to be understood as "writing" machines, we have to provide
a minimal definition of writing. The above definition fails to address the problem
of context, but it is of great interest nevertheless, because it allows machines to
enter the cultural and symbolic order of writing. This is a necessary, though
insufficient, step towards understanding the polyphony that is consubstantial to
texts in general and to digital texts in particular.
To bring our focus back to the machine, it is fully included in this tripartite
definition of writing. Firstly, it is certainly dealing with a finite set of symbols: the
first-order symbols consisting of 0’s and 1’s, as well as the second-order symbols
which are instructions – whether in hexadecimal form or in an assembly language.
These characters are symbols because they call for an interpretation, in that they
designate something other than what they are themselves: they are not only the
decimal form of a computable number, because they lead the machine to adopt
another state, another “configuration”. Secondly, the "writing" is certainly a form
of inscription. These symbols are indeed inscribed by the machine itself, which
has the capacity to note down or to obliterate symbols. Thirdly, these symbols are
definitely inscribed on a substrate: a hard disk, or the strip of paper in the Turing
machine.
To be able to assert that the Turing machine is a writing-machine, we
therefore have to postulate that writing is an inscribing operation that modifies a
substrate, and an operation of elementary manipulation of symbols. This
definition of “writing” is technical – “logistic” as Yves Jeanneret would say when
he opposes the “material dimension of the circulation of texts” to the semiotic or
poetic dimension of the interpretation of those texts17. It is technical, and not
symbolic, which is doubtless the reason why Turing takes care to refrain from
using the terms of “writing” or “reading” when referring to the activity of his
machine: the machine neither writes nor reads in the same way as a human being.
If we kept the term “writing”, which Turing abstained from doing, this is
mainly for two reasons. First, keeping the term “writing” to characterize the
activity of machines makes it possible to avoid excluding them from the realm of
culture in the name of a human monopoly over the act of interpretation – an
exclusion which is “the strongest cause of alienation in the contemporary world”,
according to Simondon. Now such a monopoly is explicitly or implicitly at work
in a great many studies on communication between humans mediated by
machines, as is the case for theories that centre on the notions of interface, source
code, software and architext. These theories are not without interest, but – being
anthropocentric – they focus exclusively on interpersonal communication between
17

Yves Jeanneret, Critique de la trivialité. Les médiations de la communication, enjeu de
pouvoir (Paris: Non Standard, 2014), 11.
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humans via machines, and not on communication between machines or on
communication between humans and machines. Why? Because they tend to
evacuate computational activity from the materiality of digital media by
subordinating it to a scheme which is anthropological and instrumental:
sometimes these machines are considered purely as a means to human ends,
sometimes as perfect executors of programmes written by humans, and sometimes
as crystallizing human values or as extensions of economic and symbolic power
relationships. In other words, because these theories lack the concept of
computational writing, they subordinate the computational activities of machines
to the regime of textual writing – which amounts to denying the existence of
computational writing. We will make a closer examination of the evacuation of
machines, first by French media theory, and then by theories that focus on the
notion of interface.
III. Humans without machines: anthropocentric perspectives on
writing in digital media theories
French media theory
The French media theory known as "les écrits d’écran" (“screens-as-writing”)18,
although it obviously takes an interest in digital media, is not a theory of the
machine; instead, it posits a type of relationship between humans and machines
that we shall now question. This theory is indeed centred on writing, but on
textual writing, and it has therefore helped to spread anthropocentric
representations of the machine that end up ignoring the machine itself. Our aim is
not to criticize this anthropocentric view as such, but rather to understand the
underlying notion of writing that makes this anthropocentric interpretation
possible.
The initial concepts of the screens-as-writing theory were developed by
Yves Jeanneret, Emmanuël Souchier and their colleagues. They were interested in
the circuits that writing moves through and – in the case of digital media – in what
made it possible for a text to be displayed before the eyes of a reader. According
18

A word-for-word rendering in English of the French term “écrits d’écran” could be
"writings made by, for and on a screen”. Emmanuël Souchier first coined the term in
1996 to emphasise the written nature of digital media. It was also a way of
legitimizing semiotics as a valid method to analyze software, web pages etc., since
these objects are considered as texts in this theory. Not only are computers based on
writing, they also produce written objects. This is why we have chosen to translate
“écrits d’écran” as screens-as-writing. Digital media obviously include a visual and
pictorial component (the screen, where the interface appears), but they are above all a
product of writing and allow users themselves to write (“writing”).
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to them, screens are also texts, and so there is no reason to oppose screens to
books: “contemporary writing happens in a new space, which is the screen. It is
therefore not appropriate to oppose “writing” to “the screen”, as has been done
too often; on the contrary, the two terms need to be considered in a coherent
fashion, emphasizing that they henceforth belong to a new stage in the historical
development of writing: “screens-as-writing”19. If we follow the reasoning of
these authors, since writing is branching out into a new form of development,
what is important is to understand what makes it possible to display a text before
the eyes of the reader. However, the writing which interests them is a form of
human writing, in the sense that it happens in the socialized space of symbolic
human exchanges. The point being that, as they are aware of the fact that the
introduction of computers has broken the “intimate and perennial” relationship
that unites the sign with its substrate, they consider that it is necessary to employ
specific tools and procedures to make writing available on a screen. In other
words, there cannot be text on a screen without having recourse to specific textual
tools: this is what they call architexts. “We use the term architexts (from archè,
origin and command) to designate the tools that make the existence of writing on
the screen possible and which not only represent the structure of the text, but also
control its execution and production”20. At the heart of their approach, there is
writing. But it is a human form of writing which, when it is digitized, must
undergo techno-semiotic mediation in order to exist and to be perceptible by
human readers. The machine, in these theories, has a dual status. First, it is a black
box, something that cannot be known without being put into a textual, readable
form. Secondly, the machine is submitted to an anthropological and instrumental
scheme. All this stems from the anthropocentric character of writing in the theory
of screens-as-writing.
Why can we say that the theory of screens-as-writing turns the machine
into a “black box”? This stems from the fact that the theory recognizes the split
brought about by computers between the substrate and the symbol, between what
is calculated and what is perceptible, and the need to build a bridge “between the
technology and language”. Mediation is necessary to make the transition
“between the requirements of the machine and those of social exchange”21 For
instance, between the data that a user enters by means of the keyboard – the letters
– and what will appear on the screen, there is a need for several intermediate
layers to translate between what is legible for a human being and what can be
Yves Jeanneret and Emmanuël Souchier, “Pour une poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” Xoana
6 (1999): 97.
20
Jeanneret and Souchier, “poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” 103.
21
Emmanuël Souchier and Yves Jeanneret, “Écriture numérique ou médias
informatisés?,” Pour la Science - Scientific American 33 (2002):102.
19
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manipulated by a machine. To bridge the gap between “the technical memory
trace which is inaccessible to humans” and “the text displayed on the screen” 22,
and vice-versa, various textual layers are inserted. There is thus a technical
dimension, the space of the machine, which remains inaccessible to humans and
thus demands mediation. There is a hidden space, that of calculation, a “black
box”23 that takes on different forms. It can be for instance an algorithm, where
“writing which has reached a degree of abstraction such that the senses cannot
perceive it without intermediaries”, an algorithm “that the eye cannot transcribe in
perceptible form”24. Each time there is a technical dimension which is absent
“from the visible scene”25, a space made up of texts “coded by and for the
machine”26, illegible as such and beyond human understanding. In other words,
the technical space for calculation cannot be perceived by humans because it is
organized for the machine. It therefore calls for processes to put it into symbols
and meanings that can be grasped by the anthropos – in short, for a form of
mediation. And this is what is of interest for the theory of screens-as-writing.
This theory thus proceeds from and produces a certain ignorance of the
machine, and focuses its attention on the mediating textual levels that make the
existence of writing on the screen possible: the architexts. It is important to
analyze these architexts to the extent that they crystallize values as well as various
socio-economic issues. It is important because, as well as making digital texts
possible, they control them in the sense that they “format” the writing as a
“discipline imposed on the ‘writing body", in the sense used by Michel
Foucault”27. It is therefore important, in the field of screens-as-writing, to develop
research that focuses on the critical study of forms of domination – symbolic as
well as economic – in the industrial architexts market. The only thing is that, as
soon as one enters the field of mediation of technical space, where bridges have
been built between technology and language, it is no longer a question of the
machine but only of humans – because these bridges correspond to human criteria
of understanding and intelligibility, where the issues at stake are human issues.
And it is these issues that are of interest to the theory of screens-as-writing, when
it seeks for example to demonstrate the power relationships established with and
through the architexts that prescribe writing. The screens-as-writing theory is
focused first and foremost on humans: humans who write to other humans, thus
Souchier and Jeanneret, “Écriture numérique,” 102.
Souchier, “Écrit d’écran”; Souchier and Jeanneret, “Écriture numérique”; Yves
Jeanneret, Y’a t-il (vraiment) des technologies de la communication? (Villeneuve
d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2007).
24
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25
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mobilizing – consciously or not – architextual layers. Or else humans, computer
programmers for example, write to machines and for them; but in fine they do this
with a view to interactions between humans. Thus, once it has been framed by the
theorists of screens-as-writing as a "black box", which therefore demands
mediation, the machine is neutralized – and in two different ways.
First, it is subservient to the humans who use it. It functions, it executes
coded programmes, as if it were an extension of the human will – sometimes
humans who have had to learn how to handle it and to speak to it so that it will do
what is ordered (i.e. computer programmers), sometimes humans who can purely
and simply ignore it (users). This neutralization of any action by the machine
itself, which rests on its subservience to an anthropological and instrumental
scheme, is in no way surprising to the extent that the “architext” concept was
formulated precisely in order to deconstruct the rhetoric of interactivity and its
attribution of a “messianic” dimension to technology28. With their “architext”
concept, these authors criticize the myth of a “human machine” according to
which a machine can act in the same way as a human being: “The key question is
simple: can a tool act in a way equal to that of a human being? The answer is just
as clear: no, it cannot […] It follows that there is not, and in the proper sense of
the term there cannot be, any possible interaction between a human being and a
machine.”29.
There is no inter-activity between a human and a machine, because the
machine does not act. If something happens on the screen after the user has
clicked on an icon, for example, it is not because the Web page itself is
interactive, it is simply because various upstream architexts have transformed the
click into a writing gesture that effects the display of a new window or image. The
interface (the screen) is taken by the semiotics of screens-as-writing only as a
translation of human acts of writing – acts that are possibly multiple, but
definitely human. This being so, saying that “the machine ‘acts’ is pure
rhetoric”30. No, the machine does not act, because action, in the eyes of Yves
Jeanneret and Emmanuël Souchier, is “a deployment of energy endowed with
meaning by a subject in a social, historical and cultural context”31. This is – of
course – something that a machine cannot lay claim to. To adopt their term, the
machine “functions”, but it does not "act".
To sum up, the first part of the operation whereby the theory of screens-aswriting neutralizes the machine involves reducing the machine to a mere
Jeanneret and Souchier, “Poétique de l’écrit d’écran.”
Jeanneret and Souchier, “Poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” 97-98.
30
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31
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instrument. And this subordination of the machine to an instrumental scheme
occurs as a reaction against the idea of a “human machine”. We can recognize
here one of the attitudes that Simondon, in his introduction to On the mode of
existence of technical objects, has taught us to spot32. This attitude consists of
reducing technical objects to mere useful instruments, in order to resist the
tendency to endow robots with human characteristics –for better or for worse. The
“better” can, for example, be manifested in the technophile rhetoric of
“interactivity”. The “worse”, on the other hand, tends to take the form of
technophobia, which conveys fear of the autonomy of technology. While
Simondon speaks of the “submission” of technical objects to an instrumental
scheme as an integral part of technophobia, the theory of screens-as-writing, with
its “architext” concept, proceeds to make this reduction as a reaction against
unconsidered technophilia. The theory of screens-as-writing, because it is based
on an anthropocentric conception of writing, leads to the neutralization of the
machine. From this perspective, it is indeed necessary to first “textualize”
computational operations so that they can be perceived as significant by human
beings; the machine is then only considered on the basis of its role in
manipulating meaningless symbols so that they can be displayed on a screen for
humans. The computational activity is only considered in so far as it makes it
possible to display writing on the screen. This is not surprising since most of the
theorists who have adopted the idea of screens-as-writing have a background in
literary studies, so that their main interest is in the circulation of texts, and thus in
human criteria of intelligibility and meaning, in their material conditions of
visibility. If they take an interest in computational activity, it is only because it is
involved in the material instantiation of contemporary texts. The way that this
theory enters into the field of digital media, via the context of textual writing, thus
leads it to doubly neutralise the machine: either the machine is what is
inaccessible to us humans and something that we can know nothing about; or else
the machine is something that intervenes in the production of contemporary texts
and makes it possible to display them on screens. This intervention is of course
32

“Our culture thus entertains two contradictory attitudes to technical objects. On the one
hand, it treats them as pure and simple assemblies of material, that are quite without
true meaning and that only provide utility. On the other hand, it assumes that these
objects are also robots, and that they harbour intentions hostile to man, or that they
represent for man a constant threat of aggression or insurrection. Thinking it best to
preserve the first character, culture strives to prevent the manifestation of the second,
and speaks of putting the machines in the service of man, in the belief that reducing it
it to slavery is a sure means [sic] of preventing rebellion of any kind.” Georges
Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris: Aubier, 1958), 11.
Translation from the French by Ninian Mellamphy [1980] available at
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anything but neutral, because it crystallizes human values and is an extension of
pre-existing power relationships. In other words, the theory of screens-as-writing
is interested in textual writing, and that has the consequence of rendering the
machine interesting only in so far as it makes it possible to display texts on the
screen, thus subordinating the machine to an anthropocentric scheme of
usefulness. The concept of architext, which quite rightly deconstructs the
marketing rhetoric of interaction, makes it possible i) to draw our attention to the
mediating layers that enable the display of text on the screen; and ii) to textualize
the technical space of the machine, considered as a black box which is
inaccessible to the human perceptual apparatus. However, by doing this, it
neutralizes the existence of the machine in two ways: i) by subordinating the
functioning of the machine to a purely utilitarian scheme according to which the
machine does nothing other than crystallize and execute human wishes and logic;
and ii) by reducing the machine to its role in the production of textual writing,
thus overlooking the computational writing activity which is specific to
computational machines.
The concept of writing, around which the theory of screens-as-writing is
built, thus tends to obscure the reality of machines. But this theory is not the only
one to have analyzed digital media and thus established a relationship between
humans and machines. A second group of theories, centred on the “interface”
notion, has also addressed this question. What are the assumptions underlying this
notion?
Interface-based theories
The term “interface” was initially employed in chemistry in the late 19th century,
to designate “a surface which separates two physically distinct states of matter”.
Gradually, the interface idea was extended to the digital domain, and then to
management theory33. In the digital domain, an interface is something that “links
the software and the hardware with each other, with humans and with other
sources of data”. In this sense, the “interface concept” does serve to conceptualize
the articulation between humans and machines, [the machine here being the
hardware], and it is the main field of study on Human-Machine Interactions
(HMI). How then do scientists in the human and social sciences, in media studies,
think of interfaces and what are the effects on the way they consider relationships
between humans and machines? In order to examine this question, we have to
start by reviewing some of the central themes of the interface idea: i) its scope
(can anything be an interface?), ii) its pretensions to invisibility (“the best
interface is no interface”), and iii) its reinsertion into broader cultural issues. On
this basis, it becomes possible to show that the theories constructed around the
33
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notion of “interface” nourish, sometimes in a paradoxical way, the instrumental
conception of technology. Finally, we will tackle the question of developing a
theory of interfaces that is able to confer an existence to computational machines.
If we attempt to circumscribe the field in which the “interface” notion can
apply, the question arises of where the interface actually stops. Is it limited to the
graphical interface, i.e. the set of icons and menus that allow us to act with digital
media? Limiting the interface to the graphical interface34, although tempting, is
doubly problematical. First, it does not take the technical diversity of interfaces
into account: some interfaces link material components to software components,
others link programmes with each other (API, or Application Programming
Interface), etc. Secondly, limiting the interface to the graphical human-machine
interface amounts to generalizing from the particular. Historically, an interface
has not always been today's general system of semiotic metaphors that makes it
possible to manipulate the machine. For example, before GUIs (Graphical User
Interfaces) came into widespread use, the main means for relating to machines
was the command line35. But if the interface cannot be reduced to the graphical
human-machine interface, should it be extended – as suggested by Alexander
Galloway – to any form of mediation, even to any kind of "go-between" (not only
a computer screen, but a sheet of paper, a door, etc.)? Is there not a risk of falling
into the opposite problem of excessive generalization to the point that it becomes
difficult to define exactly what objects one is dealing with? Galloway's definition
of the "interface" as a “borderline state”, or “a moment when one meaningful item
is understood as being distinct from another”36 is actually valid for any threshold
or indeed for any straight line or material boundary. If the emphasis is on the
interface as a process (whereby two things are brought into a relationship with
each other, especially on an interpretative or semiotic level as two “meaningful
entities”), it can easily be confused with the more general category of mediation.
After the question of circumscribing it, a second difficulty with the
"interface" notion stems from the question of its visibility. By “visibility” is
meant: does the user realize that mediation is necessary to allow the use of a
computer or a smartphone? Is there any friction, or “resistance” between the
user’s intentions and the machine? When formulated in this way, the question of
visibility is very close to that of the “transparency” of interfaces and their intuitive
nature. Now these are actually tricky questions when one addresses issues of
ergonomics or interface design. The dominant trend in contemporary design
studies holds that a good interface is one that the user is not aware of, whose
34
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mediating and framing action is not obtrusive37: “the best interface is no
interface”. This comes back to the dynamics of “immediacy” investigated by Jay
Bolter and Richard Grusin38, according to which the aim of any kind of mediation
is to remain in the background in order to keep the focus on what is to be
mediated, in this case the tasks that humans want the machines to do.
The problem is that this invisibility, this apparent “seamlessness”, can
make it difficult to achieve a critical understanding of interfaces, since the fact of
considering that they are invisible amounts to blinding oneself to their power of
configuration39. The role of the semiotician, and more generally of any human
scientist who properly fulfils their critical function, thus demands that they do not
accept the “intuitive” or “transparent” nature of the interfaces in question at face
value, but seek on the contrary to understand the operations through which these
interfaces are rendered “intuitive”. In this sense, there is always a certain
“density” to interfaces: they are the fruit of work and study (interface design),
they are a composition of signs (the “trash-bin”, the “file”, the “page”) that call
upon the memory of certain social practices or specific professional contexts.
These signs propose a certain model of the relationship with the machine. Now,
once an interface is massively adopted and industrially reproduced, this specific
model becomes dominant ipso facto. Describing an interface as “neutral” or
“invisible” prevents a proper appreciation of its influence and its cultural effects,
since its political and potentially problematic significance is evacuated under
cover of purely ergonomic considerations.
Some work has already been done with a view to taking this cultural
dimension of interfaces seriously. This is in fact central to two important theories
in the field of media studies: in the USA, the theories of Lev Manovich on the
new media; in France, the semiotics of screens-as-writing with Emmanuël
Souchier and Yves Jeanneret. Lev Manovich, in The Language of New Media40,
devotes a whole chapter to the interface notion. According to him, an interface is
a sort of converter, a “code that conveys cultural messages in a variety of
media”41. This encoding is not a simple transposition, but a translation, indeed a
trans-formation: there is no “transparency of the code”. Manovich places himself
in the realm opened up by the work of McLuhan, where media not only relay
messages, but also transform them. An interface thus has real density. It
37
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effectively modifies the perceptions of the user: "the interface shapes how the
computer user conceives the computer itself. It also determines how users think of
any media object accessed via a computer”42. The point is that the computer of the
new millennium is no longer merely a tool for calculating but a “universal media
machine”43; the “interface” is then no longer a simple means of entering into a
relationship with a machine, but a new way of envisaging media forms. This new
technology reconfigures existing cultural practices: reading, listening to music,
etc. Manovich explains: “we are no longer interfacing with a computer but with
culture encoded in digital form”44. For this reason, Manovich referred to “cultural
interfaces” rather than just “interfaces”: the way in which we think of media, and
cultural practices more generally (reading, writing, viewing, etc) is shaped in part
by the digital media themselves. The “interface”, for Manovich, thus designates a
much broader phenomenon than computers as such: by virtue of its deployment in
digital media, the interface has become our main way of understanding the world.
By highlighting certain characteristics of these new media, of their “language”,
Manovich hopes to identify certain aspects of this “interfaced” relationship with
the world.
The French theory of screens-as-writing does in a way fit in with this
analysis of the interface as embedded in the dense dimension of culture. However,
since this theory is rooted in semiotics, it gives particular attention to the signs
that make up the screens; this leads to analyses that are more restricted and local
than those of Manovich, which are broader in scope. According to Souchier and
Jeanneret, the interface (of an item of software, a Web site for example) plays a
cultural role since, as an “architext”, it “crystallizes”45 values and representations
that will affect the activities it makes possible. In the architexts can be read a
“fixation of typical uses”, in particular by way of the signs that compose the
graphical interface. This being so, a semiotic analysis of the historical and cultural
circulation of these signs (for example, the icon of the disk that indicates the
“save" function) makes it possible to demonstrate the cultural density of an
interface. However, although the theory of screens-as-writing – like Manovich's
theory – does make it possible to conceptualize the mediating and communicative
function of interfaces, it is still true that a machine is never thought of as having
the capacity to act on its own. If screens crystallize the logic of the humans who
42
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were involved in their construction (designers, engineers, etc.), if architexts frame
the act of writing according to models chosen by the developers and the software
editors, the graphical interface is portrayed as a sedimentation of professional
practices and human values. We thus find ourselves in a situation where there are
no longer any machines, only humans who enter into relationships with other
humans. The interface becomes a means whereby certain humans propose or
impose certain conceptions of writing on other humans.
In other words, in these theories the machine is reduced to a purely
instrumental scheme. This tendency was noted, and criticized, by Wendy Chun46
in her work on source code. Her argument is as follows: source-code is too often
considered as “automatically self-executable”, as allowing the display of a
graphical interface or the execution of software by virtue of its syntax alone. It is
presented as the “self-evident ground or source of our interfaces”47, which is the
result of human writing: that of the software developer giving instructions to a
machine that does nothing other than execute them perfectly. Whenever the
interface is considered as the result of a source-code, i.e. the set of instructions
given to a machine by a human being, then any analysis of interfaces eventually
results in an analysis of strictly human aims. Thus the theory of screens-aswriting, in seeking to emphasize the importance of technical mediation via the
idea of crystallization, ends up promoting an anthropological and instrumental
view of the machine according to which the interface is nothing but the result of
human intentions. Now, although it is true that these intentions are realized by a
machine via a source code, what appears on the screen is not a simple
transposition of what the developers ordered the machine to do: there is a real
discrepancy between the code and the interface, and this is because the machine
itself acts. What is at stake, then, is laying the foundations for a theory that would
give its proper place to the activity of the machine itself, and thus allow this
activity to exist and to be characterized.
In order to do this, we need to consider the interface not as the product of
human will alone, but rather as a hybrid (via a code) of human instructions on the
one hand, and execution by the machine which is not controlled entirely by prior
coding. The outlines of an approach of this sort can be found in the pioneering
studies of Brenda Laurel who, back in the 1980s, described digital interfaces as
“theatres”48. According to Laurel, an interface is a stage. It provides a “shared
Wendy Chun, “On ‘Sourcery’, or Code as Fetish,” Configurations 16/3 (2008).
Chun, “Sourcery”, 309.
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context for action in which humans and machines are agents”49. The source code
is to be understood as a script, or the text of a play, as “a set of instructions that
defines the potential actions to be performed by people and computers working
together”50. Considering the interface in terms of a stage makes it possible to
understand it not simply as the result of a programme written by humans, but as a
space where humans and machines can meet. According to Laurel, the machine
can be considered as an active agent; however the details of these actions are not
fleshed out. We are left only with the metaphor of the theatre: an entity “acts” to
the extent that it participates in the unfolding of an action. Nevertheless, the work
of Laurel can inspire a non-anthropocentric approach to digital media, making it
possible to consider that computational machines do act. “Interfaces” thus become
spaces where humans and non-humans can enter into a relationship: they are the
results of a complex interweaving of writings and objects (operating system, size
and resolution of the screen, version of the search engine, quality of the material
employed, etc.); they depend on both computational operations and human
instructions, with none of the participating entities being subservient to the actions
of the others. A semiotic analysis giving close attention to the activity of both
humans and machines can thus be deployed to bring out the cohabitation of these
two entities – rather than seeing only the human intentions “behind” the
interfaces.
The concepts of architext and interface both deal with the way humans
interact with machines. But the effect of their respective anthropocentric
presuppositions is that, only too often, they are actually questioning how human
beings interact with other human beings, the mediation by the machine being
reduced to a purely instrumental role. Whether in the ideal of a “transparent”
interface, which fades into the background to make way for the desiderata of the
user, or in the conception of an architext which is supposed to be the technical
crystallization of power relationships between humans, technical mediation in
both cases takes second place. It counts either as a necessary evil which is best
forgotten (the invisible interface), or as the substrate underlying the conduct of
human affairs (architext).
This conception of technology has consequences for the status of the signs
that appear on the screen. If, for any writing on a screen, it is valid to distinguish
the semiotic layer (the symbols to be read by humans) from the technical layer
(the operations of the machine which make it possible to display the semiotic
layer), anthropocentric perspectives on technology most often reduce the latter to
the former. Thus, if the machine is considered as a pure instrument, it is
understood as producing “text” in the human sense of the term. In other words, it
49
50

Laurel, Computers, 4.
Laurel, Computers, 45.

communication+1 Vol. 5 [2016], Iss. 1, Article 2
19

Goyet and Collomb / Do Computers Write on Electric Screens?

is an instrument capable of participating in “graphic reasoning”51, which is based
on the bi-dimensional nature of writing, on the spatial co-presence of meaningful
items, and whose structural concepts are the list, the table and the formula.
However, if the machine is indeed itself engaged in a process of writing – as it is
possible to maintain according to Turing – it is a form of writing which is not a
matter of texts but rather of calculation. And it is precisely this form of
computational writing that is obliterated by the notions of interface or architext,
because the latter focus exclusively on textual writing. What is at issue is
therefore to develop concepts that would allow us to analyze writing on a screen
while also considering the computational writing of the machine itself.
IV. How do machines write on electric screens? The need for nonanthropocentric semiotics
The first possibility would be to understand the interface not as solely the result of
a source-code, and therefore entirely subordinate to human will, but rather as a
"Place of the Third Kind", i.e. a space for shared action by the machine and the
human, and which does not belong exclusively to either of them. In this sense, the
interface is no longer understood as determined upstream by digital code written
by humans, but rather as the constantly dynamic result of interactions between
humans and machines. If, for example, a user re-dimensions a window, or clicks
on an icon to open a second window, s/he will see on the screen the result of the
combination of his or her actions with the way in which the machine adapts to the
situation and participates in it. If some of these adaptations can certainly be
written in advance, for instance when the site or the application adapts the size of
the type to the size of the window (on the responsive design principle), they also
depend on the machine which executes the code: the result will not be the same if
the computational activity is performed by a computer or by a smartphone. This
idea of the interface as a place "of the third kind" turns it into a space that results
from a combination of writing by humans and writing by machines. It is therefore
not only a process, but a hybrid process in which the machine participates fully,
and in which it is not a mere instrument but has a certain power of agency: it
writes.
However, if writing is an activity which is common to humans and
machines, and if the two can meet in interfaces, it is important to recognize not
only that the machine writes, reads and interprets, but that it does not do so in the
same way as humans. If, to follow Turing, it is possible to show in what sense
computational machines are writing machines, it should also be noted that Turing
identified two areas in which machines and humans differ: the tabular nature of
51
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writing, and interpretation. The “tabularity” of writing52 corresponds to the spatial
dimension, which is usually two-dimensional, of any text. A human writes from
top to bottom, from bottom upwards, from left to right, in boustrophedon
(alternately left-to-right and right-to-left), etc.; whatever the substrate, human
writing is a practice which is deployed in two dimensions. In contrast, the Turing
machine writes in only a single dimension. It follows the paper tape, moving only
from left to right, from one square to the next. As Turing himself wrote, “in
elementary arithmetic, the two-dimensional character of the paper is sometimes
used. But such a use is always avoidable, and I think that it will be agreed that the
two-dimensional character of paper is not essential to computation”53. Thus, even
if Turing defines calculation as a form of writing, bi-dimensionality is purely
incidental.
Then there is the question of interpretation: machines do not just execute,
they also interpret, but they interpret in a quite different way to humans. Machines
interpret because they read symbols (0’s and 1’s, or second-order symbols such as
alphabetic characters), and this activity triggers a movement on their part and a
modification of their internal state with no need for human intervention (unless
there is an abnormal breakdown), since these machines are automatic. However,
this machine-like interpretation can only occur on condition that the symbols are
not ambiguous, and that they have been explicitly foreseen in the list of all
possible states of the machine. The symbols must be rigorously monosemous, one
might say, whereas in classical semiotic theory, interpretation is linked to
polysemy, an openness to multiple possible meanings of a text according to the
reader. And it is precisely this openness that guarantees the value of reading as the
actualization of one of the potential meanings of the text. It is clearly not under
these conditions that a machine “reads” or “interprets”.
By showing that computational machines are writing machines, but that
their writing is computational and not textual, the idea is to open up the possibility
of developing a non-anthropocentric kind of semiotics that seeks, in these places
"of the third kind" that are interfaces, to avoid making computational writing
systematically subservient to textual writing – or invisible.
When distinguishing computational writing from textual writing, while
considering the former as subservient to the latter, the point is not to create an
opposition between the two. Both types of writing are in constant interaction in
interfaces, given the fact that interfaces are texts and that every text is

Christian Vandendorpe, Du Papyrus à l’Hypertexte. Essai sur les mutations du livre et
de la lecture (Paris: La Découverte, 1999), 39-68.
53
Turing, “Computable Numbers”, 245.
52

communication+1 Vol. 5 [2016], Iss. 1, Article 2
21

Goyet and Collomb / Do Computers Write on Electric Screens?

polyphonic54. A text organizes, through graphical means, a situation of
communication, and therefore the cohabitation between the entities involved in
the situation. For instance, in every text there is a way of representing the author,
the reader and the tool that was used in the writing, and all of these are visible
through editorial utterance55 (“énonciation éditoriale”). In this sense, a text is not
a requisition of pre-made entities, of “building blocks” such as Author, Reader
and Tool. Rather, it is a pattern of relationships that can best be described in
ecological terms56. As such, an interface is ecological, because it organizes a
particular relationship between computational and textual writing.
But thinking in ecological terms does not prevent us from distinguishing
different entities and different activities in a way that allows each participant in
the situation to express itself according to its own mode of expression. Neither
does it prevent us from analyzing the ideology that tends to threaten the
ecological diversity of a text by promoting the idea that the text is the product of a
single author. This is the hypothesis, formulated by Michel de Certeau, of the
“scriptural economy”57, where writing has been one of the main ideologies since
modern times. To de Certeau, writing in our society is a “myth”: it is an activity
that promotes, through the figure of the “author” for instance, a human individual
as his or her own master, capable of organizing the world according to their own
will on the blank space of the page. Writing, to de Certeau, is an ideological
operation that tends to deny the polyphony of each text. Our argument is therefore
on this ideological (or “mythical”) level. Of course, most artists, developers or
academics acknowledge the computational part of digital texts. But these are
practices that make sense as “artistic” or “innovative” precisely because they
differ from a norm, they challenge the ideology of writing as a myth and of the
computer as a mere instrument.
The computational writing theory we propose is a conceptual tool that
allows this ideology to be challenged as well. It aims to bring semiotics, as a
discipline that analyzes texts, into the toolbox to shed a new light on the nonhuman dimension of every digital text and thus to contribute to new thinking on
the polyphony of these texts.
But what might be the concrete objects of non-anthropocentric semiotics?
What precisely is there to be observed? Are not the signs indicating the
54

Mikhaïl Bakhtine, Le Principe Dialogique. Edited by Tzvetan Todorov (Paris: Le
Seuil, 1981).
55
Emmanuël Souchier, “L’image du texte. Pour une théorie de l’énonciation éditoriale,”
Cahiers de Médiologie 6 (1998): 137-145.
56
Jenny Edbauer, “Unframing models of public distribution: From rhetorical situation to
rhetorical ecologies,” Rhetoric Society Quaterly, 35/4 (2005): 5-24.
57
De Certeau, Invention du Quotidien, 195-224
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computational activity of the machine always retranslated into human language?
For example, the indication displayed on every page of Google results - “X results
in Y seconds” - is certainly a way of putting the activity of the machine into
meaningful symbols, but it is centred on the human side to the point where the
activity of the machine is subordinate to an anthropological scheme58. In other
words, the cultural and ideological weight of understanding the interface as text is
so powerful that it may be well nigh impossible to find any signs of computational
writing that are not already textual writing. Except, perhaps, by taking an interest
in outlying activities: not only artistic practices – which care less about the
intelligibility of the text produced for humans than about the potential for the
expression of the machine – but also all the occasions when the interface goes
haywire. Taking an interest in those moments when, in the midst of textual
writing, forms of computational writing suddenly invade the screen. This
happens, for instance, when there is a "bug" in the display, when a video cannot
be read because a plug-in is out of date, or when the CSS59 of a site does not
properly upload so that the text looks disorganized and anarchic on the page. But
it is also the case with glitches on Google Earth60, for example. These glitches
clearly demonstrate the mechanical composition of every interface, a composition
that is often denied by the dominant anthropocentrism that will tend to disqualify
these events as "bugs". But they are only “bugs” if we consider technical objects
from the anthropological and instrumental perspective : in the examples we have
mentioned, the machine is not making any mistakes, it is doing its job. It is
calculating and giving a graphical account of its calculations in accordance with
the information it has at its disposal. A “bug” is only a “failure” by virtue of the
ideology of the computer as a tool serving humans. The concrete objects of the
non-anthropocentric semiotics that we call for are perhaps somewhat limited, but
the fact remains that this kind of semiotics would make it possible to investigate
the omissions of current semiotics in analyzing our relationships with
computational machines, in the hope of making things happen and seeing new
fields of research appear.

Cléo Collomb and Samuel Goyet, “Meeting the machine halfway: towards a semiopolitical approach of computational action” (paper presented at the Reconfiguring
Human and Non-Humans: text, images and beyond symposium, University of
Jyväskyllä, Finland, 29-30 October 2015).
59
Cascading Style Sheet. A CSS is a language that describes the style of a document,
most often a web page. The content of the document is usually described in a HTML
document, although some of the graphical aspect of the text can be written in HTML.
60
Collomb and Goyet, “Meeting the machine halfway”, 2015.
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